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Introduction 
On 1 September 2013, hundreds of gantry and tower crane operators lodged a non-union 
strike in Yantian International Containers Terminal (YICT) and paralysed the world’s biggest 
single site container handling port, in Shenzhen, China (CLB, 2013; T. Wang, 2014). After 
two days’ mediation and negotiation, the dispute was settled with the workers’ victory against 
their employer, Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), one of the biggest global port operators, 
demonstrating the dockworkers’ impressive bargaining power. Coincidentally, the event 
happened only four months after the end of a bitter and lengthy dispute in nearby Hong Kong 
International Terminals, which is also owned by HPH (Cheng, 2014, p.218). The strike 
showed Yantian dockworkers’ persistent struggles against transnational capital within 
China’s globalised seaport industry, adding to the recent wave of collective unrest protesting 
the labour regime in China (Gray, 2015). It is surprising, however, that there was not 
adequate media coverage on the 2013 dispute, or in-depth academic studies.  
        Following China’s dramatic economic development, including the expansion of the 
transport industry, Chinese workers have enjoyed more employment opportunities, but many 
have also experienced low pay and poor working conditions. Yet the labour movement has 
been hindered by the country’s unitary industrial relations system and the malfunctioning 
official union organisation, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which 
remains ‘categorically opposed to worker mobilisation’ (Friedman and Lee, 2010, p.524). 
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Often Chinese unions can only manoeuvre between the government and labour, because they 
must balance their dual institutional identity – as government affiliates on the one hand, and 
workers’ organisations on the other (Chen, 2010, p.108).  
        Despite the lack of organised labour movements, Chinese workers’ unorganised 
collective resistance is not uncommon as industrial conflicts have grown significantly in 
recent years. Labour unrest, supported by workers’ growing awareness of rights protection, is 
based on their disruptive capacity in response to globalised capital relocation and 
restructuring (Silver, 2003; Wright, 2000). Yet Chinese workers’ resistance, such as the 2013 
Yantian dispute that reflects dockers’ bargaining power and the state of labour organisations, 
is also grounded in the development of labour agencies that are shaped by national and 
international environments. As Gray (2015) states, labour relations in East Asia is 
characterised with workers’ resistance against global capitalism and subordination in various 
processes of ‘passive revolution’ both within and beyond workplaces. Meanwhile, it is 
important to acknowledge the essence of cultural, organisational and political dynamics for 
the formation of workers’ class consciousness (Koo, 2001). In this context, the 2013 Yantian 
strike poses a number of interesting questions: How did the strike break out? What did 
dockers, workplace union and management do during the strike? What are the main factors 
contributing to the dockers’ successful campaign? How was the strike linked with dockers’ 
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capacity to disrupt the production?  How should we elucidate Yantian workers’ bargaining 
power and the state of workplace union organisation? 
        To respond to these queries, two fieldwork visits were undertaken between August 2014 
and May 2015. Access was obtained through trade unions, so the researchers were able to 
conduct interviews with 3 union officials and 7 workers. All the workers interviewed 
experienced the 2013 dispute, with the union officials being involved with the mediation and 
negotiation process. Data has also been drawn from secondary sources, namely printed and 
online reports from both foreign and Chinese media. To maintain confidentiality, all the 
interviewees are anonymous and their names are coded.  
        The rest of the paper consists of five parts. First, it discusses theories of dock strike by 
analysing the cultural explanation and dockers’ workplace bargaining power, as well as the 
impact of technology and globalisation. Second, it briefly introduces the organisational 
context of the 2013 Yantian dispute. The third and fourth parts evaluate the 2013 strike 
process, with detailed discussion of management’s response, workers’ bargaining power and 
mobilisation, and the role of the trade union. The paper concludes by highlighting the 
dispute’s implication for the transformation of Chinese labour movement, and the impact of 
changing political economy on industrial conflicts in China’s globalised seaport industry.  
 
Dockworkers, strikes and bargaining power 
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Industrial conflict at docks  
Ports and shipping are central to the economic globalisation process, as more than 80 per cent 
of global trade (by weight) with origins or destinations in developing countries is waterborne 
(Turnbull, 2000, p.376). The degree of industrial peace is vital to docks because workplace 
conflict can significantly disrupt the transportation of goods within the global shipping line. 
However, historically, dockers are among those ‘strike-prone’ occupations that are featured 
with strong union organisations and frequent mass industrial actions (Hamark, 2013; Hyman, 
1984). In Britain, for instance, docks stood out up to the 1980s as ‘the most strike-prone 
sector’, with 50 per cent of dockers on strike each year compared with 5 per cent of other 
non-coal workers (Edwards, 1995, p.451).  
The traditional debate about dockers’ strike proneness hinged on the extent to which this 
is associated with dockers’ occupational, cultural and organisational characteristic, recurrent 
grievances and effective union mobilisation. Kerr and Siegel (1954, pp.203-204) attributed 
this to dockers’ isolated mass status, strong sense of closed community, higher degree of 
internal cohesion and unique identity detached from the external society. Dock work was said 
to require heavy, physical effort and dangerous operation, with their accident rate being one 
of the highest in all industrial occupations (Miller, 1969, p.306). Doing physically demanding 
and dangerous jobs made dockers tough and combative workers who were more likely to 
strike (Kerr and Siegel, 1954, p.195).   
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        The isolated mass thesis has been questioned by many commentators. As Edwards (1977) 
puts it, the main reason for frequent conflict in docks is the changing management practices 
that have generated more grievances. Dockers are not usually exclusively separated from 
other communities, and the model of workplace relationship should not be a static and 
isolated one for such claim ‘fails to explain variations over time and also within industries’ 
(Edwards, 1995, p.449). Nonetheless, this is not to dismiss the idea of community and the 
sense of common purpose that can help understand the dynamic character of workplace 
relations, and dockers’ ability to mobilise and sustain collective solidarity (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004, p.345).  
However in recent years, docks around the world have become a relatively quieter arena 
where the frequency of strike has been much less than before (Silver, 2003, pp.99-100). Part 
of the change is linked to technological innovation largely resulted from the increasingly 
globalised sea port industry world-wide. In particular, the containerisation and the growing 
volume of global freight logistics have reshaped the scale of port infrastructure, accompanied 
with the intensification of global capital investment and the use of labour-saving technology 
(Hall, 2009, pp.68-69). The deregulation of employment schemes, together with new work 
practices such as just-in-time and casualisation (Turnbull and Wass, 2007, p.587), has 
dramatically downsized the historically militant dock labour force and in large part account 
for the dramatic decline in labour unrest (Silver, 2003, p.111). Yet dockers still possess a 
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strong sense of solidarity and collectivity (Turnbull, 2000, p.375).  While some unions have 
found it harder to protect members’ interests against multinational corporations, many other 
unions’ resistance is more successful (Turnbull and Wass, 2007, p.609). As dockers strive to 
‘retain control of traditional dock work’ (Edwards, 1995, p.452), bitter disputes continue to 
emerge in the waterfront where dockers keep resisting the threats of job removal and wage 
squeeze in an increasingly globalised industry.          
 
Bargaining power, globalisation and technology innovation  
Another powerful account for dockers’ capacity to strike is the notion of bargaining power, 
including associational power and structural power (Wright, 2000, p.957). Associational 
power is supported by unions and political parties, while structural power includes market 
bargaining power that comes from the tight labour market and workplace bargaining power 
that comes from ‘workers’ strategic position of a particular group of workers within a key 
industrial sector’ (Wright, 2000, p.962). Associational power can also be moral or symbolic 
power, involving ‘the struggle of “right” against “wrong”, providing a basis for an appeal 
both to the public and politicians, as well as to allies in civil society’ (Webster, Lambert and 
Bezuidenhout, 2008, p.12). Workplace bargaining power refers to dockers’ bargaining 
advantage and disruptive potential ability to ‘harm distribution, production and profit’ 
(Hamark, 2013, p.279), and their ‘remarkable degree of autonomy and control’ (Turnbull, 
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2001, p.367). Dockers are among some jobs that are ‘central to the production process, with a 
high disruptive potential’ (Martin, 1992, p.36). Because the disruption caused by transport 
workers’ struggles can usually have high level of deterrent as it will go beyond the 
transportation and logistics network, they ‘have possessed and continue to possess relatively 
strong workplace bargaining power’ (Silver, 2003, p.100). In addition, dockers may also 
possess another type of structural power, logistical power, which can take ‘matters out of the 
workplace and onto the landscape where workplaces are located’ (Webster et al., 2008, p.13). 
        For docks around the world, the economic globalisation and technological advancement 
have had profound influence on the changing dynamics of workplace labour relations. Since 
the 1950s, containerisation, the foremost port labour-saving technology, has radically altered 
port-cargo handling methods across the world (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002, p.529). But 
its impact on dockers’ capacity to strike is not a straightforward picture. On the one hand, 
dockers’ bargaining power is threatened by improved productivity, increased automation and 
reduced demand for dock labour force, mainly casual and periphery workers (Martin, 1992, 
p.170). For instance in the USA, due to the use of new machinery, by the mid-1980s 
dockworker jobs declined 60 percent compared with the level in the 1970s at most ports 
(Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002, p.529). Job losses and increased substitutability of labour 
can directly lead to dockers’ decreased market bargaining power, union membership and 
associational power. Moreover, the automated operation means most dockworkers are 
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increasingly working in isolated small units, making it harder for them to develop collegiate 
spirit and solidarity. It also makes the defence of workers’ collective interests more difficult 
due to the increased flexibility of work (Martin, 1992, p.170).  
        On the other hand, new technologies may enhance core dockers’ bargaining power, 
because now the operation of modern ports, closely integrated with global production and 
supply chains, is more vulnerable and these skilled dockers could find it easier to disrupt 
production than before thanks to higher cost related to disruption. First, the expansion of 
containerised cargo ports has increased the demand for skilled dockworkers that can handle 
the modern machinery, and reinforced their market and workplace bargaining powers that are 
derived from their strategic position within the production process. Port employers, 
meanwhile, are more reluctant to see industrial disputes due to ‘the rising costs from 
disruptions in the utilization of expensive port infrastructures and container ships’ (Schwarz-
Miller and Talley, 2002, p.529).  
        Second, dockworker unions have  renewed their mobilisation strategies to respond to the 
changing political and economic environments. For example, after the 1980s, American dock 
unions increased their campaigns for negotiating work conservation schemes and securing 
pay rises, and made some gains through these activities (Schwarz-Miller and Talley, 2002, 
p.528). But meanwhile employers have updated  their counter strategies that are also 
empowered by technological fixes (Silver, 2003, p.101). Third, modern technology is 
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influential for empowering workers’ logistical power. For instance during the 1995-98 
Liverpool dock dispute, dockers used the internet to call for international unions’ support  
(Carter, Stewart, Hogan and Kornberger, 2003, p.302). Such logistical power is important as 
it ‘takes structural power outside the workplace and into the public domain’ (Webster et al., 
2008, p.13). This is not to deny, of course, that the success of a dispute relies on many other 
factors, such as the employers’ strategy, labour market conditions and public support. 
 
Industrial relations in Yantian 
The development of YICT 
The proliferation of China’s container port industry, the world’s fastest growing one in recent 
decades, has been dramatic since the early 1980s. As one of the major destinations for global 
foreign direct investment and a manufacturing powerhouse, China needs a significant logistic 
system, such as shipping and ports, to support the economic advancement (Thun, 2014, 
p.302). Between 1982 and 2000, the annual increase rate of seaport container throughput was 
more than 10 per cent, with the importance of container cargos to China’s sea ports jumping 
from less than 5 per cent in 1980 to nearly 60 per cent in 1998 (Cullinane, Fei and Cullinane, 
2004, p.35).  Now China is a dominant player in the international ocean transport sector, and 
there has been huge amount of investment, including foreign capital, being poured into the 
country’s container transport industry (Cullinane et al., 2004). One of the most prominent 
11 
 
ports is Yantian port (YICT), the country’s largest single-site container terminal and the only 
major seaport controlled by a foreign company.  
        YICT was established in 1994 as a joint venture, and has been since controlled by Hong 
Kong based HPH. Yantian port is within a cluster of giant sea ports along China’s southern 
coast line that encompasses over 60 per cent of the country’s total container throughput 
(Cullinane et al., 2004, p.39). In only 20 years, YICT developed 16 large deep-water 
container berths, becoming the busiest container cargo port in China and a main hub for 
international shipping in the region (K. Wang, 2014). The company’s leading position is 
reinforced by its location in South China, which is the so-called ‘world factory’ region 
offering huge flow of import and export cargoes, making YICT an important part in the 
global supply chain. On the other hand, YICT’s business is often constrained by China’s 
cumbersome customs procedures and ‘anything else involving substantial government input’ 
(Cullinane et al., 2004, p.52).  
        YICT directly employs 2,300 staff, 800 of whom are crane operators (HPH, 2013). In 
addition, there are 3,000 sub-contracted employees working around the port to provide 
peripheral and support services. Within its management team is the well-known YICT union 
(affiliated to the ACFTU) that is branded by the authorities as a ‘model workplace union’ (T. 
Wang, 2014). The union distinguishes itself by a ‘democratic’ direct election system, one of 
the very few such types in contemporary China as its chair person is elected every three years 
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(Interview 7); although in fact, this was pushed by Yantian dockworkers in the first place 
after a high profile dispute in 2007. Nevertheless, the state mediation, in this case a relaxation 
of the restrict labour regime in a foreign invested port, seems to provide some room for 
workers’ collective resistance and some (limited) degree of union democracy.  
 
The 2007 dispute and union election 
The 2007 Yantian union direct election was not a voluntary experiment, rather it was a 
tentative attempt triggered by the workers’ spontaneous strike, which was the result of 
dockers’ grievances over low pay and the lack of employee voice mechanism. A non-union 
firm at the time, YICT had already been very successful in its expansion, achieving a profit 
increase of nearly fivefold in the past 10 years (Wang, 2013). But employees did not get a 
corresponding pay rise for a number of years and their discontent accumulated gradually until 
a number of crane operators started the strike on 7 April 2007 (CLB, 2013). The walkout 
resulted in an immediate stoppage of the port operation and serious disruption to the regional 
supply chain. Dockers’ demands included not only better wages, but also the ‘somewhat 
unusual demand to set up their own union, an indication of their desire to exercise greater 
control over their own workplace’ (Friedman and Lee, 2010, p.520). The strike was settled 
promptly, and workers were soon offered with wage increase and immediate union 
establishment through election.  
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        As a turning point in China’s contemporary labour history, the 2007 YICT union 
election reform signalled that grassroots union reform became possible. Workers in the 
nearby region’s companies started to follow this model and asked for establishing union 
organisations, including the high profile 2010 Nanhai Honda strike (Lyddon, Cao, Meng and 
Lu, 2015). Despite its shortcomings such as the controlled nomination, YICT reform has been 
regarded as a landmark event (Wang, 2013) and a significant step forward for the ACFTU 
since never before had any union officials been directly elected in China’s transport industry. 
Yet workers’ growing consciousness was not accidental; rather it was deeply rooted in the 
transformation of the political economy in the region, especially the Chinese government’s 
changing dispute resolution method used to sustain globalised capitalist production (Gray, 
2015). After the election the Yantian workplace union played a key role in helping establish 
wage collective consultation mechanisms and maintain regular union elections. In the 
following 6 years, through annual wage consultations, employees had a ‘steady and 
continuous pay rise’, contributing to what the ACFTU regarded as the ‘more harmonious 
labour relations’ and ‘increasingly higher working enthusiasm’ among dockworkers 
(Workers Daily, 2011). It seemed that the reform was able to bring in industrial peace, which 
was kept until September 2013 when a new strike broke out again in YICT.  
 
The 2013 Yantian strike process 
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The September 2013 Yantian dispute was another unorganised sit-in strike, as workers 
exercised their bargaining power again through spontaneous and collective action. It is 
important to note that in early 2013, dockers in Hong Kong Terminals (HIT) held a 40-day 
strike, which was featured with intense collective bargaining from beginning to end and 
independent unions that played a leading role. During the event, over 400 dock crane 
operators demanded a 20 per cent pay rise and better working conditions, paralysing the 
world’s third-busiest container port (wsj.com, 2013). A wide range of societal demonstrations, 
rallies and donations offered significant political and financial support to  the dockers who 
had been undermined by the limited political space for the labour movement (Cheng, 2014, 
p.218). The strike was eventually settled with a 9.8 per cent pay rise after the employer 
endured considerable political and economic pressures.  With a ‘half-victory’ (SCMP, 2013), 
the Hong Kong dock strike did make workers better understand their labour rights and 
bargaining power. On the other hand, despite YICT and HIT being both operated by HPH, 
Yantian dockers were not directly connected with their Hong Kong counterparts working 
only 50 miles away, because they worked in two completely different systems (labour market, 
industrial relations climate and legal environment). But the Hong Kong dispute was widely 
reported by China’s official media, including Xinhuanet (2013) that looked at the strike and 
negotiation processes. Hong Kong dockers’ fight against the city’s richest tycoon and his sub-
contractors was inspirational for colleagues around the world, certainly including those in 
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Yantian, many of whom had suffered serious pressures from globalisation and intensification 
of work.  
        Hiller (1969) pointed out that strikers usually needed to have justifications for their 
behaviours. To this end, YICT workers’ demand for a 2,000 – 3,000 Yuan pay rise was 
linked with their grievance over the company’s changes in housing benefits and education 
subsidies, something that would see ‘workers’ net income being cut’ (Interview 6). The 
stoppage happened during the shift change at 8:00 on the Sunday morning, 1 September 2013, 
initiated by a group of day-shift gantry crane operators, who refused to operate their 
machinery (T. Wang, 2014). These operators’ action was soon followed by more tower crane 
operators, who also stopped working (CLB, 2013). Admittedly it was not a well-coordinated 
event since there was no union involvement in the beginning, nor did any striking workers 
ask the union to step in. Soon the action spread to the majority of the workforce and workers 
marched around the office building and then gathered in the dining hall discussing their 
tactics (Interview 7).  Despite the union’s non-involvement, the dockers were able to stand 
together with their collective demand, as many of them had experienced the spontaneous 
strike in 2007.  
        Over the years, due to management’s dominance during the wage consultation process, 
Yantian dockers’ real concerns were rarely taken into account by the company. The 500 
Yuan allowance, given to crane operators after the 2007 dispute, gradually lost its importance 
16 
 
as employees in other positions were also awarded similar amount of allowances. In addition, 
the 9-grade pay structure, being set up after 2007 to reflect a widened gap between different 
grades, caused many workers’ complaints of ‘unequal distribution’ between similar jobs. For 
instance, tower crane operators could only be paid about 6,000 Yuan, but gantry crane 
operators received 9,000 to 10,000 Yuan. Furthermore, in 2013 YICT’s implemented a new 
housing fund policy that saw most employees’ net income reduced, and this resulted in 
grievances among most workers who believed that the company was too mean (T. Wang, 
2014). Despite the company’s successful business achievement and steady pay rise, workers 
still felt being unfairly treated and some, especially crane operators, believed that YICT was 
not generous in paying its employees (Interview 6).  The company was said not to care about 
workers’ real concerns. As one crane operator said:  
 
This housing fund (in 2013) led to a pay cut in real terms compared with our 
increased contribution. We could only get 5,000 Yuan net income each month and 
how could you buy property in Shenzhen with such a low income? We have to live 
and raise our families, especially children. The company should seriously listen to 
our concerns (Interview 2).  
The stoppage was initiated by gantry crane operators that were deeply worried about the loss 
caused by the housing fund change, although they were paid higher than some other staff in 
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the port. Just half an hour later, the workplace union officials were called back to the 
company to help solve the situation and act as mediator. It was a peculiar bargaining scene 
because managers and workers did not talk face to face, with the union acting as the middle 
agency passing messages between the two parties (Interview 7). As the company tried, but 
failed, to persuade workers to resume work, soon the whole Yantian port production stopped 
and cargo lorries started to form a long queue along the road outside the port 
(Chinaworker.org, 2013).   
        The first day’s negotiation lasted until two o’clock in the morning, with little progress 
being made because management refused to make substantial concessions and workers also 
had different ideas from time to time. Dockers were unable to agree with a clear and 
consistent target, and it was difficult for strikers to carry on mobilising collective interests 
when there is no institutional organisation and proper leadership. By next morning the senior 
official from Shenzhen municipal union came and helped the mediation. Meanwhile, more 
port employees joined the strike, including most support and control room staff (Interview 6). 
While the operation was stopped, huge numbers of containers were left in the port without 
being inspected or loaded/unloaded (Interview 7). The company was also under pressure 
from the local government, which was ‘deeply concerned’ about the impact of the strike 
(CLB, 2013). After a few rounds of intensive talks, a deal was finally struck, and workers 
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ended the strike at 4 pm in the afternoon. The settlement was to offer all workers an 
equivalent 30 per cent pay rise, about 1,700 Yuan increase per month (T. Wang, 2014).   
 
YICT, dockworkers and workplace union during the strike 
What made the YICT to compromise again? 
YICT quickly settled the dispute mainly because the company was worried about the 
economic and political impact. Economically the company needed to maintain a steady 
operation and competitive advantage (K. Wang, 2014), and a stable employment relationship 
is vital for retaining such a position. For YICT, it was sensible to settle the strike swiftly, 
because in an industry where there is worker flexibility, high capital investment and tightly 
coupled supply chains, firms tend to prioritise ‘the avoidance of disputes’ (Martin, 1992, 
p.181), and this is even more so in globalised container ports (Turnbull and Wass, 2007). 
        Politically the government and ACFTU did not want any workplace conflict escalated, 
and the transport industry is a sensitive area for foreign investment (CLB, 2013). The 
government’s key concern was to avoid the domino effect of wider social unrest. For YICT, 
maintaining a good relationship with the authorities was vital, and a quick settlement could 
pacify such concern and avoid further loss.  
The role of the workplace union 
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Prior to the walkout, the dockers’ secretive mobilisation was unknown to union officials, and 
the union’s intervention was initially resisted by strikers. However, the union did play a key 
role during the negotiation process after the union was able to be accepted and trusted by both 
the dockworkers and management. As one of the union officials said,  
 
Obviously we were under pressure when we were given such an important role to 
convince workers to resume production. But we were also proud of the fact that 
the union was the only organisation that was trusted by both the staff and the 
company senior management; … for the company, we are very important 
(Interview 7).  
The union was accepted by workers because they ‘didn’t want to stand out by themselves as 
they might worry about job security; … so by the end they agreed that the union could 
represent them in negotiations’ (Interview 7). With workers needing formal leadership the 
union acted as mediator and a coordinator to look after strikers’ opinions. It was 
acknowledged by some workers that the union chair was popular because ‘he is a great guy 
who has helped us a lot’ (Interview 2). The final negotiation and settlement were also 
facilitated by the union as well.  The contribution of the YICT union demonstrates the fact 
that union intervention can help to institutionalise conflict (Mills, 1948) and, in the case of 
China, to defuse conflict (Chen, 2010, p.105). As one union official suggested, collective 
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bargaining could happen during the dispute ‘when both management and workers accepted us 
as the formal “middle man” in negotiations’ (Interview 7). Nevertheless, this was only a one-
off process, and since the end of the 2013 dispute, the union has not been given any official 
role to represent workers in collective bargaining.    
 
Yantian dockers’ bargaining power 
The dispute shows Yantian dockworkers’ great courage and capacity to defend their interests 
through unorganised action. It is likely that what workers learned in the 2007 dispute helped 
them to start another strike. As Edwards (1995) argues, there is an established habit to the use 
of strike, and ‘once it has become accepted as the means to resolve disputes, its use becomes 
taken for granted’ (p.450). But more importantly, it was dockworkers’ bargaining power that 
was able to help their successful campaign. Such power came from their jobs as the key 
operators in a busy container port, the extended support from more fellow colleagues and 
their effective mobilisation tactics.  
        First, Yantian dockers’ high degree of disruptive capacity is based on their structural 
power, mainly workplace bargaining power, relevant to the particular nature of the dock 
labour process and the use of modern cargo handling technology that has made the port 
operation more vulnerable to disruption. In 2012, YICT made a historical breakthrough by 
achieving 100 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit) annual throughput, a threshold 
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marking the port’s world-class status (T. Wang, 2014). Such improvement in productivity 
and efficiency does mean that any disruption of production will cause significant damage to 
the company. Dockers believed that they were very important because ‘most operation 
positions are not easy to be immediately substituted in the local labour market’ (Interview 6), 
and once the strike started, the disruption ‘could cost the company a lot of money in a very 
short period of time’ (Interview 9).  
        Dockers’ structural power also includes their logistical power. Although much of 
Yantian dockers’ mobilisation process was not known to the public, and nobody has been 
identified as the strike leader, dockers effectively utilised social media, especially mobile 
phones and the internet, to communicate and mobilise.  Their job did not allow them to gather 
often, but they found opportunities to be together when they were off work and exchanged 
ideas by using online chatrooms such as QQ and Wechat, through which some important 
conversations could be undertaken to determine the time and actions of the first stoppage (T. 
Wang, 2014). As a docker remembered: ‘Concerned with the housing fund policy, crane 
operators felt deep pressure because their net income reduced more significantly….So before 
the strike started many colleagues spoke up about their feelings in the QQ chat rooms. The 
housing fund problem suddenly escalated the conflict…’ (Interview 6). This type of logistical 
power strengthened dockers’ preparation, as the cyberspace communication can ‘provide the 
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opportunity to create new networks’ that help workers to reconfigure space and coordinate 
campaigns (Webster et al., 2008, p.192). 
        Second, Yantian dockworkers did have certain level of associational power, although 
such power was limited. Despite the absence of union organising, there was a sense of 
collectivism among strikers, demonstrated by the extended strike participation, increasing 
from about a few hundred operators in 2007 to nearly the entire workforce in 2013. In 
addition, the union network was used by workers as many strikers were also workplace union 
committee members. During the dispute dockers used union office space as their base to 
discuss demands and negotiation strategies. As described by a senior union official, ‘the 
small union meeting room was stuffed with the union committee members who were also on 
strike; … our first meeting took one hour before we could get a closer sense of workers’ 
demand’ (T. Wang, 2014).  
        Another type of associational power is dockers’ moral power. Although dockers might 
have a lower degree of collectivity at work due to separated operation system,  the discontent 
regarding pay and job intensification  did strengthen their determination to unite together 
(Interview 6). As an operator said: 
 
The crane job is not easy as we all have back injuries. We are concerned about the 
consequences of working high above the ground, but this has not been taken care 
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of by the company. We cannot work too long and we might have to retire earlier, 
or transfer to another job’ (Interview 4). 
Such sentiment was shared by many dockers in Yantian. One tower crane operator admitted 
that he was deeply concerned about his health, as doctor had recommended him not to 
continue doing a dangerous and heavy job like crane operation. He said: ‘I definitely cannot 
continue this job until 60 [when I retire]. It is not about income but the company must care 
about our health’ (Interview 1). With the common interests relating to pay and working 
conditions, the sense of injustice and grievance made Yantian workers focus on finding the 
way in which these could be changed. When dockers had a common sense of grievance it was 
easier to form a united and powerful alliance.  
 
Conclusion  
The 2013 Yantian strike demonstrates Chinese dockers’ collective resistance, just like their 
Hong Kong counterparts a few months earlier, against multinational capital in a globalised 
waterfront. Despite the absence of strong institutional support from official unions, Yantian 
dockers used alternative methods to mobilise themselves, showing the extent of Chinese 
workers’ defiance of the labour regime and subordination (Gray, 2015). In many respects it 
reflects the strength of dockers with traditionally strong community and occupational culture, 
and the dynamics of job control and workers’ bargaining power, especially the strong 
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structural power at the point of production (Silver, 2003). Such power came from 
dockworkers’ position within the production process and the vulnerability of the container 
port operation that is shadowed by technological innovation and globalised supply chain. 
Social media offered dockers alternative means of logistical power, which was helpful for the 
campaign because it was less hindered by workplace management. The unorganised dockers 
were supported by large numbers of colleagues and the negotiations were assisted by the 
workplace union, offering a sense of associational power although such power was delicate 
and limited.  
        On the other hand, Yantian workers’ bargaining power would not easily be materialised 
if the internal and external contexts were different, as the transformation of the labour 
movement in East Asia are not isolated from historical, cultural and political dimensions 
(Gray, 2015). Like Korea’s labour movement in the 1980s and 1990s (Koo, 2001), Chinese 
workers’ struggle is shaped by globalisation that has complex consequence for the formation 
of a new generation of working class, and the status of labour organisations is also adjusted 
by particular experiences of the country’s changing labour regime (Gray, 2008, p. 28). More 
importantly, because economic globalisation has made container terminal operators 
extremely cautious about ‘the high cost of any disruption to shipping in ports’ (Turnball and 
Wass, p. 589), Yantian workers were able to succeed in this instance. In contrast with the 
2013 Hong Kong dock strike which became a public event and drew world-wide attention, 
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the Yantian strike was not widely known due to the authority’s censorship on media coverage. 
However, the two cases share a common feature, as they both helped workers to further 
understand the importance of collective action in protecting their rights. The Yantian case 
recapitulates the fact that the development of Chinese industrial relations is pertinent to 
unorganised workers who ‘have imposed great pressures on employers’ (Liu and Li, 2014, 
p.86). As Gray (2015, p. 151) highlights, the recent labour unrest in the country represents ‘a 
qualitative shift towards a militant workers’ consciousness capable of challenging Chinese 
labour subordination’. Yet like most collective disputes in contemporary China, such a 
victory can be only momentous because workers’ protests are still ‘constrained by existing 
political conditions’ (Friedman and Lee, 2010, p.521). The headway of China’s labour 
movement, like what has been happening in Yantian, will primarily depend on the 
unpredictable development of the region’s political economy.   
        The event also manifests the dilemma of the highly-praised ‘Yantian union model’ in 
sustaining industrial peace. It may be plausible to claim that direct elections are generally 
positive, but they ‘cannot solve everything’ (Wang, 2013) since the so-called democratic 
election is hindered by political, institutional and structural problems (Howell, 2008, p.861). 
Yantian workers have not been given substantial democratic rights after the 2013 dispute and 
their workplace union, like those affiliated to ACFTU, has not changed much. Ironically just 
few months later, in May 2014, YICT was ‘honoured’ with the ‘May 1st Labor Medal’, the 
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ACFTU’s highest award, for its ‘excellent maintenance of the harmonious workplace labour 
relations’ (Chinaports.org, 2014). At the same time, it was rumoured that a few strike 
activists had been quietly sacked by YICT after the dispute (Interview 6). Again, it is the 
political economy of Chinese labour that plays a major role to influence the extent of worker 
resistance and union reform, as well as employers’ response (Gray, 2015). Hence Yantian 
workers may need the workplace union that can help enhance their bargaining power. Despite 
the dockers’ strength to take collective action, such compromise and corporation are 
necessary, since there are always ‘harsh realities of employment relationships’ in the 
dockyard (Turnbull, 2001, p.372).   
 
 
Interview list: 
 
Interview 1, YICT tower crane operator, May 2015 
Interview 2, YICT gantry crane operator, May 2015 
Interview 3, YICT gantry crane operator, May 2015 
Interview 4, YICT gantry crane operator, May 2015 
Interview 5, YICT coach driver, May 2015 
Interview 6, YICT engineer department, May 2015 
Interview 7, YICT union official, August 2014 
Interview 8, YICT union official, August 2014 
Interview 9, YICT port security department, May 2015 
Interview 10, YICT union official, May 2015 
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